governed by formal contract rather than personal trust, with bids and offers matched often by computer algorithms without the need for human intermediation in market making. For the pioneers of the quantitative revolution in finance, such as Black (1971a) and Merton (1994) , these developments are to be welcomed as an achievement, an icon of rationality and modernity. According to this perspective capacities to trade on-screen offer the potential to reconfigure the geographies of information flows that constitute the process by which prices are produced and transactions secured, undermining the power of intermediaries to shape and profit from these flows (French and Leyshon, 2004) . Key to this has been the demise of trading floors and the development of interconnected screenbased trading platforms that promise a regime of distributed informational transparency (Munesia, 2000) . As such, on-screen markets offer the potential for markets to become what they`should be' in both economic and legal discursive understandings of them.
This paper explores significance of the enrolling of innovations in communications and information technologies for the markets in trade execution services once dominated by stock exchanges. It develops a case study of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE): its place within configuring a market for Canadian-listed equities; and the strategic deployment of technical innovations within its price-discovery process. I query the relation between technical possibilities, liberal logics and the concrete reconfiguration of market architectures, arguing that the enrolling of on-screen trading technologies and the translation of various kinds of abstractions into prevailing institutional arrangements are significantly structured by historical and geographical contingencies (Lutz, 1998; Weber and Posner, 2000) . Narrative emphasis on the performative power of sociotechnical innovations (Callon, 1998; Miller, 2002) , the deterritorialisation of financial relations (Cohen, 1998; Power, 2001) , and the associated erosion of state capacities (Cerny, 2002) often sustains an impoverished understanding of the complex spatial practices at play. Evidence from Canada on the reconfiguration of the markets that the TSE traditionally laid claim to suggests that the necessary work involved in enrolling technical innovations within market formations entails the mobilisation of investments in property rights, rules of exchange, and structures of governance (Fligstein, 2001; Mansfield, 2005) . The associated institutional and regulatory transformations, it is argued, are consequently animated in important ways by situated logics and imperatives (Peck, 2005) . This has implications for our understanding of the structuration of financial markets, suggesting that narrative emphasis on the disembedding of market participants and regulatory convergence around neoliberal norms of competition, choice, and the proper scope of regulation needs to be qualified by an understanding of the timings and spaces in which these ideas, associated technologies, and practices are encountered (Livingstone, 2004) .
Finance, power, and on-screen markets Over the last thirty years, financial spaces have become defined less by coterminous political frontiers and marketplaces than by the reach of different monies' and financial instruments' use and authority. This process has been characterised by Cohen (1998) as deterritorialisation' to highlight the ways in which the rise of electronic markets, the reemergence of global finance and associated transterritorial developments have challenged territorialised forms of organisation. Cerny has argued that preexisting national state-based systems of financial regulation and intervention have become less effective,`a combination of the symbolic and fungible character of money itself plus dramatic innovations in communications and information technology ... [dwarfing] monitoring and controlling capabilities as well as ... public financial resources'' (2002, page 210). The associated growth of interregional capital flows, complex patterns of crossborder price sensitivity, and the spectre of financial contagion signifies a reshuffling of organisational and geographical sources of power in monetary and financial relations (see Andrews et al, 2002) . For Cerny, at play here are not only`two-level' games in which the state mediates between international pressures and`domestic' political processes, but also the rapid development of`third-level' games that crosscut the state from above, below, and within. These involve the privatisation of governance itself (Lake, 1999) as the structuration of markets and their regulation shifts away from formal state institutions to the evolution of market practices and the structural incentives that international capital mobility creates. The result is a``creeping liberalisation'' (Cerny, 2002 , page 213) that does not necessarily require either interstate cooperation or the hegemony of stronger states. Policy transfer and apparent convergence instead often operate through a combination of regulatory capture and arbitrage, driving state agencies to compete with one another through simultaneous neoliberal emulation, recasting the role of the state as guardian of the integrity of transnationalising market mechanisms.
This depiction of the reconfiguration of financial space and the place of regulation within it draws on research into the reform of domestic securities markets (for example, Coleman, 1994; Laurence, 2001; Moran, 1991) and into the evolution of interstate regimes of information sharing and cooperation (Coleman and Underhill, 1998; Kapstein, 1994) . Notwithstanding the common patterns identified, this portrayal of the making of`global finance' takes too much for granted in``the practical, essential characteristics of state and non-state authority which allow capital to exist _ that make markets work _ [and enable] capital mobility to expand'' (Sinclair, 2001, page 94) . The language of the rescaling and treatment of the national as largely residual reifies global finance, foreclosing discussion of the situatedness of the logics and imperatives that animate the creation of new institutional and regulatory landscapes (Peck and Tickell, 2002) . What needs to be better understood is how practical rationalities and their associated technologies, projects of market-building, and the state are interwoven (compare O'Malley et al, 1997; O'Neill, 1997) . This is not to argue that the reconfiguration of market architectures as ones of flow is necessarily subordinated to state actors, but rather to propose that we think about the making of`global finance' in terms of the interplay of orderings of different institutional composition and spatial reach, overarching governmentalities that come to prevail, and settlements yielded through the practical politics of making markets (compare Amin, 2004) . In the sections that follow, I seek to illustrate this in relation to the configuring over time of a market for Canadian-listed equities and the place of the TSE within the institutional and regulatory arrangements that have come to prevail.
Configuring a Canadian equity market
Trading securities has always been a highly`technologised' activity (MacKenzie, 2005; Preda, 2004) . Historically, voices, hand signals, and handshakes have been complemented by more permanent media (from the quill pen and paper, to newsprint, telegraph, telephone, and stock ticker) and sociotechnical investments (from spatiotemporal arrangements of encounter to discursive idioms, metrological devices, regulatory institutions, and legally binding inscriptions). Taken together, these organise the encounter between supply and demand, engineer the moment of exchange, and configure the formation of prices, constituting elements of what economists refer to as the`price-discovery' process. In the late 19th century, the establishing of stock exchanges in Canada, and efforts to organise equity trading around the sociotechnical investments that constituted their trading floors, reflected historically specific strategic enactments to shape this process of price discovery by powerful stakeholders inside and outside the market (see Armstrong, 1997; Whiteside, 1985) . In contrast to exchanges in New York and London that were established before the revolution in connectivity associated with the telegraph, ticker machine, and telephone (Michie, 1997 ), Canada's exchanges developed within a relatively integrated international capital market where information flows were much quicker and more reliable than previously. At the time, the mobilisation of capital for this thinly populated, resourceoriented economy was dominated by interests and institutions based in British and American metropolitan centres (Bliss, 1987, page 183) . Consequently, Canada's first securities exchange, the Montreal Stock Exchange (ME, established 1872), evolved very much in the shadow of more established central markets. It had to establish a niche, listing regional financial institutions, utilities, and transportation companies, while``the big money was sentöor came fromöelsewhere'' (Taylor and Baskerville, 1994, page 225) . Reflecting this, most of the ME's largest capitalised listings were interlisted on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, established 1792) and London Stock Exchange (established 1801).
Soon after its incorporation, the ME vied for business not only with more established foreign exchanges, but also from smaller Canadian regional exchanges. These included the TSE (established 1874), the Standard Stock and Mining Exchange (1897), the Winnipeg Stock Exchange (1903), the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE, 1907) and the Calgary Stock Exchange (1913) . Key to the growth of these exchanges was the development of mining on the Canadian Shield, enabling ambitious stock promoters to generate interest among a broad base of retail investors in Canadian-based listings. The TSE played an important role in the construction of this new`economy of appearances ' (Tsing, 2000) , establishing a reputation domestically and internationally for floating speculative mineral exploration and mining ventures (Whiteside, 1979, page 220) . In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, listings of local rival exchanges were folded into the TSE, consolidating its profile within Ontario. By the outbreak of the Second World War it had overtaken the ME in terms of the value and volume of equities traded in Canada, and was well positioned to benefit from the rapid pace of industrialisation in Canada's economy after the war and from Ontario's place at the heart of this. By the early 1960s the combined trade captured by the TSE in interlisted and sole listed issues amounted to 70% of the value of trading executed on Canadian exchanges (see figure 1) , far eclipsing the ME (which had a 27% share).
Governing securities trading in Ontario
Competition over listings and order flow among stock exchanges is``difficult to discriminate from competition over the form of the trading institution itself '' (Domowitz, 1993, page 55) . Founded as a mutual association of specialised intermediaries, TSE and its member firms created a distinctive habitus of capacities, rules, and procedures that centred on the exchange floor and its trading posts (Armstrong, 1997) . This shaped the circulation of information on buy-and-sell orders within the markets they participated in, establishing a collective basis upon which orders in Canadian-based listings could be prioritised, matching made possible, and profits derived. Member firms devised a range of sociotechnical investments that sought simultaneously to reward, restrain, and regularise opportunistic behaviour on the floor. This was done under a provincial charter that member firms had lobbied for. The charter recognised the exchange as a self-regulatory organisation (SRO), delegating the TSE considerable autonomy in governing its members' affairs and legitimising its role in setting standards of conduct and rule making. Constitutionally, the Canadian provinces had jurisdiction over property rights. Consequently, when the effectiveness of`self-regulation' in maintaining socially legitimate markets was questioned in the 1930s, it was Ontario and the other provinces that created regulatory agencies independent of the exchanges. As in the United States, these bureaucratic interventions``did not replace the self-regulatory associations. Each new aspect of oversight further institutionalised the existing self-regulatory arrangements'' (Abolafia, 1996, page 176) . In part, this reflected the connections in Canada between the market-making activities of the exchanges and projects of province building, circumscribing regulatory strategies available to newly established securities commissions (see Armstrong, 2001) . Consequently, the principle of self-regulation survived evidence of its shortcomings in practice.
In Ontario the basic framework for regulation was codified in the Securities Acts of 1945 and 1947. This legislation developed out of the recommendations of a Royal Commission on the Mining Industry established to investigate the declining fortunes of Ontario's mineral prospectors (Ontario, 1944) . The commission's principle conclusion was that fraudulent activity in the sale of securities had so undermined public confidence that the``legitimate financing of mining developments'' was being hampered (Condon, 1998, page 18) . This enquiry and the ensuing legislation marked an important point of departure in prevailing discourses and modalities of securities regulation. The role of bureaucratic intervention in the organising of markets was formally constructed in terms of providing appropriate conditions for public confidence in those markets. The legal framework was designed to encourage personal integrity and financial responsibility, using`transparency' as a key regulative principle. This principle was grounded in legal constructions of`fairness' and`equity', associated with a longer standing belief that transparency is a hallmark of liberal democracies (see Clark, 1997; Seligman, 2003; Sunstein, 1990) . These statutory provisions were implemented through an empowered provincial securities agency, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), which in turn delegated responsibility for devising practical arrangements to ensure investor protection to recognised SROs. Coleman (1989) interprets this development as a transition from informal understandings between the state and SROs in the regulation of members' conduct to an explicit mandateöa movement from`pure' to`mandated' self-regulation. This meant that securities traded through a recognised exchange in Ontario (ie the TSE) were exempt from administrative oversight by the OSC. The public agency instead directed its meagre resources towards pursuing local boiler-shop' share-trading operations that competed with the TSE and threatened its reputation.
In the postwar period, the TSE assumed the role of de facto national exchange. Nevertheless, periodic fraudulent stock promotions and evidence of manipulation of securities prices persisted. A seeming lack of accountability undermined public confidence in the institution, earning Ontario international notoriety, especially with irate American investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Armstrong, 2001) . At one point in 1964 four public enquiries were concurrently looking into various aspects of the market for equities listed in Ontario and the activities of the TSE and its member firms (see Canada, 1964; Ontario, 1965a; 1965b; 1969) . One went so far as to criticise TSE member firms for regarding the public securities market as`a private gaming club maintained for their own benefit'' (Ontario, 1965a, page 97) . Indicative of how far the exchange's legitimacy as an SRO had been eroded, in June 1965 its governors and members held an extraordinary meeting to ratify a telling public declaration:``the exchange, owned and governed by an association of individuals known as members of The Exchange, is in fact an organisation and institution which must be governed and operated for and in the interests of the public at large'' (quoted in TSE, 1983, page 16).
A key priority identified in each public enquiry was the task of devising practical arrangements to shore up public confidence in the TSE's markets. By the close of the 1960s the exchange's membership was mobilised to reposition the institution as a kind of moral guarantor of market making. It appointed its first nonmember president, revised rules governing the operation of the trading floor, established a market surveillance department, and participated in the development of a mandatory professional training course through the newly established Canadian Securities Institute. These initiatives reflected attempts to make the institution appear publicly accountable, codifying exchange-floor practices, filtering entry to the profession through accredited qualifications, and presenting the institution as a quasi-public utility. Nevertheless, disenchantment among Canadian and American investors was such that the provincial legislature revised the legislative framework (Securities Act, 1966; Securities Amendment Act, 1969; Toronto Stock Exchange Act, 1969) , granting the OSC more extensive powers to oversee the exchange's regulation of members' activities. Until then the only sanction available to the OSC was an impractical one: the power to withdraw recognition of the TSE as an exchange. The legislative reforms empowered the OSC to review any element of the TSE's price-discovery process, ensuring it met`public interest' criteria and intervening on a discretionary basis (Waitzer, 1981) .
The regulatory reforms of the 1960s marked an important point of departure for the exchange, formally qualifying its powers to translate market norms into standards, to translate sequences of trading practices into required procedures, and to control the informational advantages these powers afforded members. The TSE was now subject to greater scrutiny by the provincial regulator, albeit one that was not sufficiently resourced for the task. Increasingly, the power of market intermediaries to control the circulation of the flows of information that governed price discovery became the object of discourses of investor protection mobilised within the OSC and legislature alike. Debates over the meaning of`fairness' in the marketplace and its contestation within the courts gave the OSC a new privileged position in the regulatory process vis-a© -vis the TSE. However, the regulator was still very much dependent on the TSE and its member firms for expertise and particularistic knowledge on the workings of the Canadian equity market (Harris, 1998) . As a consequence, for much of the 1970s its adjudications on contentious issues such as the use of electronic trading technologies, the capital adequacy of securities firms, the future of fixed brokerage commission rates, and the entry of foreign competitors (each facets of market liberalisation), suggest the OSC was`co-opted' by the TSE and the interests of market incumbents.
This said, during the 1970s the interests of the TSE itself became increasingly varied, contradictory, and the product of constant negotiation in response to both changing external factors and shifts in the balance of power within the organisation (Condon, 1998, page 168) . By the close of the decade deep divisions had emerged within its membership. These reflected the growing power of institutional investors within the marketplace and the success of the ME and NYSE in attracting order flow in TSE interlisted stocks (see figure 2) . Cohesion within the exchange's membership ruptured as the viability of the domestic securities industry and Toronto's place at its heart was challenged by structural changes in demand for its services and by the associated internationalisation of capital markets. By the mid-1980s the ME and NYSE captured as much as 13% and 40%, respectively, of the value of trading in Canadianbased interlisted stocks. Much of this was institutional order flow. Meanwhile on the TSE itself the proportion of institutional trading by value rose from less than 30% in 1970 to 59% by 1989. To compete for this type of order flow and with rival exchanges, TSE member firms faced rising capital requirements, precipitating a wave of mergers and acquisitions within Ontario's securities industry. Amidst these structural upheavals, the OSC was called upon to exercise its new powers in adjudicating on debates within the TSE over how the industry's and exchange's price-discovery process should be restructured [see Condon (1998) for an examination of these interventions].
OSC hearings on a variety of aspects of regulatory reform during the late 1970s and early 1980s exposed a``lack of first-hand knowledge of the securities business'' within the commission and a less than adequate capacity to analyse market practices (Harris, 1998, page 536) . However, they also marked the beginnings of a serious challenge to the TSE's monopoly in regulatory experience and expertise. The appointment of Stanley Beck (formerly the Dean of Osgoode Law School) in 1985 was significant in this respect. He quickly strengthened the OSC's analytical capacities, appointing a significant number of securities lawyers, accountants, and economists. The expertise they brought to the agency and the scholarly traditions they drew upon proved important, informing the TSE's perspectives on markets and legitimising expanding its role in (re)shaping those it had jurisdiction over. The significance of these developments was to become particularly evident in a long-running debate over the enrolling of on-screen trading platforms into the business of trading equities listed in Ontario.
The TSE:`towards an ideal market' In 1983 an in-house TSE publication candidly admitted``there will never be a perfect market place'', yet confidently stated that the exchange``is in the vanguard of the quest for an ideal market'' (TSE, 1983, page 17, emphasis added). That same year, the exchange's president, members of its board of governors, and its floor traders processed through the city's financial quarter to mark the closure of its old trading floor,`the temple ' (constructed in 1937) , and opening of a new computer-assisted, fully networked trading floor at First Canadian Place. The TSE was coming of age. It was embracing innovations in market governance and technology to secure its role as the de facto national exchange, a`public' institution, and key point of articulation between international flows of equity investment and the Canadian space economy. Yet, the institutional arrangements and collective investment that the new trading-floor facility embodied reflected a contested, on-going process of market reconfiguration. At the heart of this process was the changing nature of demand for the exchange's services, regulatory pressures to facilitate socially legitimate, efficient, and competitive markets, and the possibilities that new technical capacities offered to reorient actual market formations towards a regime of distributed informational transparency, an ideal compatible with both legal and economic disciplinary understandings of how markets ought to operate (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2001; 2002a; 2002b) .
The TSE had begun to explore the application of information technologies to the workings of the exchange as early as 1963, purchasing a Ferranti-Packard computer system to provide a dial-in quotation service (TSE, 1982) . In 1969, amidst rising trading volumes that strained the trading-floor facility and the back offices of member firms, the exchange's board of governors directed its systems planning department to investigate possible ways of using telecommunications and information technologies to support trading requirements (Bell Canada, 1970) . In the United States, ideas about automating elements of price formation had been circulating for some time. This was one of the recommendations of the SEC's influential Special Study in 1963 [SEC, 1963; see Moran (1991) for an account of the study's significance for subsequent US regulatory developments]. Indeed, the NYSE had committed significant resources to research ways in which computer-based technologies might be introduced. It initiated several large pilot projects during the 1960s, from which its research staff produced an extensive automation paper, though this was never officially released (NYSE, 1968) . The paper proposed providing floor brokers with trading terminals to eliminate the generation of paper and to speed up the processing of trades,`locking in' the deployment of terminals within the floor of the exchange. However, the NYSE board, composed largely of senior floor traders and designated market makers, was wary of the implications these arrangements might have for its power to control the circulation of information about demand and supply on the exchange floor. The proposals were shelved (Cleland, 1979) .
The technical possibilities which the NYSE rejected, in contrast the TSE pursued. They had their origins in the science^state nexus of the Cold War. Their lineage can be traced to the application of computational theory and techniques of linear programming in the late 1950s by the US Airforce in its SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) air defense system. Essentially applications in`yield management', they were first put to commercial use by American Airlines in its SABRE reservation system. Turning logical paradoxes into effective algorithms and computational architectures, these techniques led to``a reconceptualisation of the`rational' economic agent as a self-contained information processor'' (Mirowski, 1999, page 707) and of markets as an ecosystem of multiform agents and institutions (2002, page 543) . For leading thinkers and practitioners within finance's quantitative revolution, such as Black (1971a; 1971b; 1995) , the application of these ideas and technologies within the market place was to be welcomed as a means of devising exchange mechanisms characterised by strong forms of efficiency that embody the arithmetical foundations of high modernity (MacKenzie, 2001 ). This would mean dispensing with trading floors and reducing or even eliminating the need for specialists. The automation of stock exchanges, Black suggested, would cut exchanges loose from the weight of history and geography, effectively extending``the conditions of`the laboratory of economics' to the external world through computational and technological means'' (Munesia, 2000, page 293) .
However, as MacKenzie and Millo's (2003) study of the Chicago Board Options Exchange illustrates, the role of mathematical theory and information technologies in reengineering concrete market formations has been by no means straightforward. Their study of the`performativity' of option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) in the construction of a market for financial derivatives in the United States illustrates the ways in which financial theory, as a`world-making' enterprise, exists in tension with forces undermining and resisting its assumptions. There is a complex dialectic between theory and practice in finance, creating historically and geographically contingent forms of visibility and patterns of organisational significance. Market configurations, MacKenzie and Millo argue, are ever provisional,``the outcome of a conflictual, embedded process'' (2003, page 140) wherein the persuasive power of financial economics flows through particular configurations of cultural, legal, political, and institutional relations (compare Said, 1991) . Consequently, the application of mathematical theory and information technologies to the workings of the TSE did not point to a world smoothly performed. Rather, as we shall see, its``quest for an ideal market'' (TSE, 1983, page 17) existed in tension with forces undermining and resisting it.
The exchange's preliminary analysis of the enrolling of electronic technologies into its trading arrangements concluded that potential economic benefits would be maximised only if all trading-related data were captured at source and the exchange floor eliminated. This would supposedly lower costs for member firms, aid the exchange in competing for interlisted order flow, and provide a means to extend the international reach of the institution's markets. In light of this report, the TSE board authorised work to begin in 1971 on simulating computerised trading on Air Canada's ReserVec II reservation system (an adaptation of SABRE). The`demonstration effect' of the exercise, linking traders in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montreal, sufficiently impressed the board that it committed a notional amount of between Can $7 million and Can $10 million to the in-house design of a prototype Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS). To support the project, a subcommittee of the TSE board was formed to determine the system's rules for handling different types of orders. This group worked in liaison with the exchange's technical experts in the information systems department and a group of twenty`pilot traders'. The active involvement of senior market participants in the project underlines that what was at stake was less a technical issue (that is, how to trade via remotely located computer terminals) and more an issue of the establishment of an architecture of common understandings, rules, and procedures that would harness the possibilities that new technical capacities offered on the most advantageous terms. For electronic markets``mark not simply a`medium' for the transmission of messages and information _ [but also] a building site on which a whole economic and epistemological world is erected'' (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002a, page 395).
In 1977 CATS was inaugurated as the world's first exchange-operated remote entry electronic equity order matching and execution system. Champions of electronic trading within the exchange argued that``the availability of an automated trading system creates opportunities for streamlined procedures through linkages to other computerised systems such as order matching systems, clearing and settlement systems, broker accounting systems and information services. Such a trading system also opens up the possibility of providing international access, linking overseas terminals to the TSE'' (TSE, 1982, page 6). However, TSE-designated market makers and those floor traders who specialised in servicing retail orders resisted transferring listings of stocks to CATS. At the time, retail order flow still accounted for the larger share of the value of trading executed on the exchange (66%). These orders were channelled to market makers' trading posts on the floor of the exchange. Consequently, market makers were in a powerful position to persuade the firms that employed them (the larger TSE member firms) that the enrolling of CATS would undermine the informational advantages member firms enjoyed over other market participants and the profitability of servicing retail clients (Cohen et al, 1986 , pages 51^53). These concerns were well founded as CATS would introduce a relatively more transparent limit order book that would give all market participants more information than previously made available on buying and selling interest in listed securities. Market makers recognised that the new system would undermine their role and influence in the marketplace, because on the floor``you can barter ... [while] in CATS you either take what's offered or queue up with the rest'' (TSE, 1990, page 2, emphasis added).
In light of this, only 700 noninterlisted stocks deemed as`inactive' were transferred across to the new electronic trading facility. By tradition, bids and offers for these types of stocks had been filed openly at the designated trading post. The role of an associated market maker was viewed as essentially administrative, processing trades when a posted bid or offer was accepted by another floor trader. The efficiencies to be gained from migrating these stocks across to CATS seemed obvious to both market makers and the board of the exchange. However, the ambitions of exchange officials and the minority of member firms who relied upon institutional business to migrate all of the exchange's listings across to CATS were blocked. Arguments to fully deploy CATS for the sake of gains in efficiency and international competitiveness proved less than capable of convincing the general membership. Closure on the subject was attained when the SEC ruled that the TSE would have to comply with US regulatory oversight if CATS terminals were placed in the United States. So, despite the scale of resources (both financial and personnel) committed by member firms to the development of CATS, its practical significance for the workings of the exchange was at best partial. This was underlined in 1979, just two years after CATS was launched, by the decision, noted at the beginning of this section of the paper, to develop a new trading-floor facility at First Canadian Place.
Reconfiguring the TSE on-screen By the 1980s deep divisions had emerged within TSE's membership. These reflected the growing power of institutional investors and the success of the ME and NYSE in attracting institutional order flow in TSE interlisted stocks. Amidst these shifts within the competitive environment, the OSC was called upon to adjudicate on debates within the TSE over how the industry's and exchange's price-discovery process should be restructured. Stanley Beck, its chairman, was familiar with contemporaneous developments in New York's and London's financial centres and was convinced of the need for regulatory reform of Ontario's securities industry and capital markets. He and the responsible provincial government minister, Monte Kwinter, embarked on a liberalisation program between 1986 and 1987 (see Harris, 1998) . The lifting of ownership restrictions on Ontario's securities industry was structured and timed to create five large Canadian bank-owned securities firms [see Tickell (2000) on the broader significance of this]. These firms would dominate the flow of orders that passed across the trading books of the TSE, competing for business with around 100 independent and foreign-owned member firms. The bank-owned member firms inherited significant retail operations; however, by the late 1980s a larger proportion of the value of their business was generated from institutional clients. This had important implications for the influence of the TSE's market makers over strategic decision making within member firms and for the future of the exchange's trading-floor facility (McKinsey, 1989) .
Market makers' influence was further undermined as the markets the TSE traditionally laid claim to became increasingly fragmented. Their power to capture liquidity on the floor of the exchange in TSE-listed stocks was usurped through the interlisting of stocks by issuers, diversion of order flow by Canadian institutional investors, and the activities of some of the larger member firms. During the 1980s, an increasing number of TSE-based issuers interlisted on American exchanges (see figure 2) (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993; Mittoo, 1992) . In 1980 82 issues were interlisted on either the NYSE or NASDAQ, rising to 240 by 1998. Reasons for listing in the United States included the felt need to diversify their base of investors, the presence of an affiliate abroad, and strengthening their reputation among investors (Nigam, 1989) . These issuers represented a variety of economic sectors, including mineral prospecting and mining, industrials and utilities, but all of them were Canadian enterprises whose businesses had become increasingly oriented towards international markets (for example, Barrick Gold, Magna, and Northern Telecom). They were also the TSE's best capitalised and most active issues (ie its`blue-chip' stocks). Between 1988 and 1995, the TSE's share in the value of trading in Canadian-based US interlisted issues declined, while the NYSE's share rose to as much as 40% and NASDAQ's rose to 13%. The exchange seemed to be losing out despite what its research department considered to be its`home-market advantage' (TSE, 1998) . Canadian institutional investors took advantage of differentials in trading costs between the TSE and US exchanges in interlisteds, gravitating to the cheapest alternative for particular stocks (Harmes, 1998) . This permeability of the Canada^United States border was an asymmetric one. American institutional investors were reluctant to embrace exchange-rate risk, operated under different regulatory constraints, and were bound by`soft-dollar' transactions to particular US investment banks and the exchanges they had seats on (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) .
The TSE responded to competition for interlisted order flow by incrementally modifying its rules and proceduresöin particular, those that governed members crossing buy-and-sell orders outside the floor of the exchange (`cross-interference' and`principaltrading' rules) (see figure 2) . The liberalisation of these restrictions was first initiated in the 1950s in response to new trading practices on the ME. Rules were loosened further during the 1970s as the institutionalisation of the market gathered pace and as competition from US exchanges was more keenly felt. This was seen as necessary to accommodate the needs and retain the business of institutional investors, who were reluctant to expose large orders to the TSE's public auction process directed by market makers on the exchange floor. Instead, block transactions were increasingly handled`upstairs' in member firms' offices and later reported as a`done deal' on the floor of the exchange. Similar practices have evolved in the United States, but in Canada the`cross-interference' and`principaltrading' rules are much more liberal. Consequently, the Canadian`upstairs' market is proportionately much more significant, diverting order flow away from the books of trading positions maintained by the TSE's market makers.
Since the 1980s this trend has gathered pace, reflecting not only the institutionalisation of investing, but also the introduction by the larger TSE member of firms of Order Management Systems (OMSs) (see figure 2) . Liberal order handling rules enabled these members to deploy OMSs to pool small orders from their dispersed retail-branch networks, filter them automatically by symbol, volume, price, duration, and terms of trade, and parcel them together according to the anticipated trading costs associated with their execution. Over time, an increasing proportion of retail order flow handled in this way was directed away from the exchange floor and internally crossed in thè upstairs market' against institutional order flow. This served to boost the revenues of the member firms, which were earning commissions on both the buy and sell sides of internally crossed orders. The practice was justified in terms of providing enhanced immediacy for retail customers. However, it served to undermine the power of the exchange to compete with other markets on the basis of the liquidity of its central order book. It also marginalised TSE market makers, who matched a declining proportion of the trades reported on the TSE tape (only 42% of the trades by 1998). A TSE enquiry struck in the early 1990söinto this and other forms of market fragmentationöconcluded that``members negatively affect the exchange's ability to compete by seeking out short term profit-maximising opportunities ... the continuous pursuit of parochial interests by member firms could act to the detriment of the TSE overall _ impairing the Exchange's price discovery process'' (TSE, 1997, page 75). Short-term profiteering among the large bank-owned member firms was actively undermining the relations of mutuality that by tradition had been a cornerstone of the institution.
In sum, the growth of interlisting, pressure from Canadian institutional investors, and the activities of larger member firms contributed to reengineering, in a piecemeal fashion, the market architecture towards one of flow among a complex array of competing quasi-public and private marketplaces. Within this process, TSE market makers became increasingly marginalised, enabling the exchange's board of governors by 1992 to overcome decades of institutional inertia over the fate of the trading floor. The president justified the planned closure of the floor in terms of competitiveness and consumer empowerment, arguing that lower transaction costs, tighter settlement cycles, greater transparency, and better surveillance would``reduce investors' fears of unfairness associated with a manual system of trading'' (Bunting, 1992) . The benefits, however, were in reality less clear-cut given the measurable growth of the`upstairs' market, the declining significance of the exchange's`public' central order book (be it electronic or otherwise), and the now dominant proportion of trading volume on the TSE accounted for by five Canadian bank-owned member firms. The floor closure project anticipated migrating stocks across to an upgraded version of CATS, by now a neglected piece of proprietary technology. This proved problematic given the pace of technical change since its inauguration in 1977. After the TSE had spent over $35 million attempting to upgrade CATS, numerous system crashes and associated reputational damage forced the TSE board to abandon the in-house project in 1995. In its place, the board purchased the Paris Bourse's NSC trading technology (ironically, originally based on CATS) (see Munesia, 2004) . It was not until 1997 that the exchange finally closed its trading-floor facility, migrating all of its listings across to a fully automated distributed electronic trading platform, reconfiguring the TSE as an on-screen marketplace.
Reconfiguring the market's architecture Deliberation within the TSE over electronic trading and the future of its trading-floor facility unfolded at the same time as developments in the United States raised the possibility of the circumnavigation or`disintermediation' of traditional market architectures centred on securities exchanges and their member firms. This was associated with the entry into the American market for trade execution services of privately owned on-screen order-matching and execution systems known as Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). These provide specialised types of order-matching services that enable portfolio managers to better handle different configurations of the explicit and implicit costs associated with executing a trade. (1) As exemplified with the development of the`upstairs' market, the capacities, rules, and procedures of an exchange's trading floor cannot reconcile on equal terms all of the potentially conflicting priorities and contingencies associated with different trading strategies. Whereas trades within an exchange's`upstairs' market address this through the agency of member firms, ECNs offer the possibility of linking trading counterparties directly with one another (Domowitz and Steil, 1999) .
In the United States the potential for communication and information technologies to reconfigure traditional market architectures was first mooted by the SEC in its mold-breaking Special Study of Securities Markets (1963) . The Special Study drew upon newly acquired expertise within the agency to advocate the deployment of technology' as a means of fashioning legal and economic disciplinary understandings of what constituted a properly functioning market (see Moran, 1991) . The report was highly critical of prevailing systems of self-regulation, and, in particular, of the performance of stock exchanges, concluding that floor trading``is a vestige of the`private club' character of stock exchanges and should not be permitted to continue'' (SEC, 1963 , quoted in Seligman, 2003 . Signalling the erosion of the SEC's dependence on market practitioners for regulatory expertise, the report drew upon legal and economic perspectives on the utility of informational`transparency' as a market problem solver. Enhancing the transparency of information circulating about orders and prices among market participants, it was anticipated, would aid in the delivery of investor protection and market integrity (compare Sunstein, 1990) . By 1971`transparency' came to symbolise for the SEC not only`fair' markets, but also more efficient, liquid, and competitive ones. In the commission's proposal for a National Market System (NMS), it floated the idea of utilising new communication technologies and rule-making powers to establish a`market for marketplaces' that traded those securities deemed to be of national significance; a single``competitive regime'' (SEC, 1971 , quoted in Lee, 1998 ) that tied together participating exchanges and over-the-counter markets in the United States.
In the wake of Wall Street's`back-office crisis', Congress gave the SEC an explicit mandate and the necessary powers to engineer an NMS in 1975 (Seligman, 2003, pages 450^534) . Tellingly, the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 neither defined the term National Market System' nor specified in detail its components. Rather, the task of facilitating an evolution of existing market architectures towards a more competitive regime of distributed informational transparency on market-making activities was delegated to the SEC. Since then the commission has overseen the creation of a consolidated quotation system, mandated intermarket communications linkages, and made rulings
(1) The costs to be considered in deciding how to execute a particular trade include: explicit ones such as brokerage commissions and soft-dollar arrangements; and implicit ones associated with the significance of immediacy of execution, possible market impact, the degree of transparency of information on prices, and the consequences of information on identity and intentions leaking into the marketplace (Davis and Steil, 2001 , pages 399^436).
intended to encourage greater competition for established market makers. The rulings intended to encourage competition included classifying ECNs as`broker-dealers' through the commission's`no action' procedure. This exempted ECNs from the weight of reporting and regulatory obligations that established exchanges operated under, thereby creating competitive pressures for NYSE and NASDAQ to reform prevailing practices. It was not until 1998, with the passing of Regulation ATS (Alternative Trading System), that the SEC finally established the conditions under which an ECN should be redesignated as an exchange, counterbalancing the perceived benefits of competition and liberalisation with those that conventional wisdom dictated are associated with a centralised marketplace (OSC, 1999) . By this time, ECNs had come to account for over 35% of orders in securities listed on NASDAQ and for 8% of those on the NYSE.
These developments in the United States figured large within debates on the future of the TSE's trading floor and electronic trading in Ontario. In 1988 Instinet Canada Limited (a subsidiary of Reuters) purchased a seat on the TSE and sought authority from the exchange to operate as an ECN, internally matching TSE-listed stocks for institutional clients. The five bank-owned member firms strongly opposed this application, recognising the competitive threat Instinet posed to the TSE's`upstairs' market, one that the bank-owned member firms dominated. As a consequence, the application was referred to the OSC for arbitration. The commission, by now receptive to legal and economic scholarly arguments about the potential benefits of electronic trading for investors, ruled that Instinet should in principle be allowed to operate as a TSE member firm. However, it stipulated that Instinet would have to delay deploying its terminals in Ontario until the TSE conducted a review of the terms and conditions under which this might be done. This ruling proved significant. On the one hand, it offered the TSE and its member firms a temporary brace in the erosion of their market power. The OSC justified this in terms of the public interest, arguing that further market fragmentation could jeopardise the survival of`an independent' capital market in Canada (Brown, 1999) . On the other hand, the commission's ruling signalled to the Canadian brokerage community that the provincial regulator was no longer as dependent on the regulatory expertise and experience of the TSE and its members. The OSC formed a special unit of lawyers and economists to study what the implications would be for the Canadian capital market if non-SRO electronic trading systems were allowed to operate in Ontario (OSC, 1994) . After running an industry-wide consultation process to discuss the issues identified (OSC, 1998) , the unit devised a set of far-reaching proposals for the entry of ECNs that entailed a radical reconfiguration of the existing architecture for trading equities in Canada, creating Canada's own national market system:`a consolidated Canadian market' or market of marketplaces (OSC, 1999) . The OSC's briefing papers and proposals contrasted markedly with those it produced for past enquiries. What set them apart was the knowledge they demonstrated of academic perspectives on securities markets, practical developments, policy debates in the United States and elsewhere, and issues specific to the Canadian space economy. Framed in terms of choice, competition, and efficiency, neoliberal conceptions of progress towards disintermediated spaces of flows were tempered by: firstly, an assumption that Canadian issuers and investors are best served by a capital market controlled and directed by Canadian interests; and, secondly, related concerns about the comparatively small size of Canada's equity market relative to the United States, the highly concentrated structure of the domestic financial services industry, and the risk of illiquidity if the Canadian market were to fragment further than already is the case. As the OSC iteratively modified its proposals for a Consolidated Canadian Market (CCM), the dialectic between theory and practice produced historically and geographically contingent forms of visibility and patterns of organisational significance.
The reform project culminated in the implementation by each provincial securities commission of National Instrument 21-101 (Marketplace Operation) and National Instrument 23-101 (Trading Rules) (2) in December 2001 (see figure 2) . The intention was to establish a common market architecture that would harness the possibilities which new technical capacities offered to reorient actual market formations towards a more transparent, competitive array of marketplaces, while ensuring the survival of an independent Canadian capital market.
Under the new regime,`marketplaces' were defined as either recognised exchanges, quotation and trade-reporting systems, or an entity that uses nondiscretionary methods for executing trades from multiple buyers and sellers (that is, an ECN). To operate as à marketplace', an ECN was required to register as a dealer with the OSC, contract regulatory services from a`regulation services provider', and maintain an electronic connection with the`principal Canadian market' for each security it traded (in all likelihood the TSE). Consequently, ECNs were exempted from the requirements expected of a recognised exchange to regulate issuers, discipline subscribers, and guarantee a market. At the same time, they were, in theory, offered a choice about the form and intensity of their regulation. In this way, securities regulators sought to establish provisions for the consolidation and integration of information on trading on different marketplaces in the same security (through connections with a principal market), while allowing for the possibility of different trading rules being adopted among competing marketplaces (through the delegation of regulation-setting functions to contracted`regulation services providers'). As Condon notes, this``turns on its head the notion of regulation as a set of authoritative pronouncements from centralised power and implies that`regulation services' are themselves another commodity to be bought and sold in the market '' (2004, page 428) . This said, the provisions retained discretionary decision-making powers for provincial regulators over who can operate a marketplace and an obligation to oversee the activities of recognised`regulation services providers'. Consequently, the institutional and regulatory arrangements for a Canadian`market for marketplaces' represented not so much a decentring of`authority itself ' through`the market' (see Black, 2001) , as a more variable, multi-institutional form of statecraft that sought to respond to both domestic concerns and international competitive pressures.
Much of the intent of this legislation was preempted by the TSE between the tabling of the OSC's proposals and the wrapping up of its public consultation exercise. In 1999 the exchange coordinated a restructuring of Canada's stock exchanges, eliminating the fragmentation of order flow through interlisting on Canadian exchanges. The TSE assumed sole responsibility for senior listings, while the ME specialised in derivatives trading. The Alberta Stock Exchange and VSE merged to form the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX), specialising in junior listings (`penny stocks'). Soon afterwards the CDNX was acquired by the TSE, which rebranded itself as the TSX Group, an`operator of marketplaces'. This new entity streamlined its governance procedures in 2000, demutualising and spinning off its market regulatory responsibilities to a jointly held subsidiary, Regulation Services (RS Inc.) (see figure 2).
(2) Discussions on the drafting of National Instruments 21-101 and 23-101 [together known as the Alternative Trading System (ATS) Rules] were conducted under the auspices of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), a forum bringing together the thirteen securities regulators of Canada's provinces and territories. The objectives of the ATS Rules were to: facilitate competition among market places and thereby investor choice; maintain and improve the integrity of markets where there are multiple market places trading the same securities; and minimize the impact of any fragmentation of order flow caused by competition through transparency and other requirements.
These manoeuvres by the TSX, in advance of the CCM coming into being, strengthened its hold on the market for junior and senior Canadian-based listing (creating an internal`farm system' in which junior listings could`graduate') and effectively captured the market for regulation services (through RS Inc.). In repositioning the TSX strategically in these ways, its leadership sought to anchor the CCM, retaining the exchange's influence over the terms under which a potential competitor might enter the Canadiaǹ market for marketplaces'. Driving this was not only the threat of competition from foreign-based ECNs entering the Canadian market, but also the possibility that one or more of the five bank-owned TSE member firms could, technically, reconfigure their OMSs as ECNs. As RS Inc. is currently the only regulation services provider independent' of an exchange in Canada, the apparent commodification of Canadian regulatory power bears a strong resemblance in practice to traditional self-regulatory arrangements. This suggests caution is required in interpreting processes of policy convergence around neoliberal norms (Cerny, 2002) . In Canada``established interests appear to have maintained their influence over a regulatory process designed to promote broader competition, new players, and greater choice for _ investors'' (Condon, 2004, page 430) .
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the Canadian experience suggests the relationship between theory and practice in finance is a complex dialectical one, structured in significant ways by the spaces of encounter between emerging social technologies and property rights, rules of exchange, and structures of governance. Neglect of these rights, rules, and structures, risks absolutising`the market' (Barber, 1977) , overplaying evidence for the emergence of a`deterritorialised' geography of spaces of flow (Cohen, 1998) and the erosion of state capacities (Cerny, 2002) . As regimes of distributed informational transparency, on-screen markets do indeed offer potential for markets becoming what they`should be' in both economic and legal discursive understandings of them (Blyth, 2003) . However, as Beunza and Stark have argued elsewhere,``one cannot read the future geography of finance directly from the technologies of trading '' (2003, page 157) . The translation of new technical capacities into practical arrangements for making markets is both a technical endeavour and a political enterprise (MacKenzie, 2005) . For equities, competition over order flow and the related``battle for efficient markets'' (The Economist 2000, page 99) is not a linear process inevitably leading towards à deterritorialised' geography of spaces of flow. How property rights, rules of exchange, and structures of governance are constituted and contested in particular times and spaces is significant in this respect. The institutional and regulatory landscapes of projects of market building bear a freight from the past whose significance cannot be dismissed easily (Vogel, 1996) . Consequently, even though the centralised marketplace of the exchange and its trading floor may have given way to a less stable array of competing quasi-public and private marketplaces, the associated institutional and regulatory transformations that constitute this architecture of flow are animated in important ways by situated logics and imperatives. Therefore, Cerny's``creeping liberalisation'' (2002, page 213) around particular norms of competition, choice, and the proper scope of regulation needs to be qualified through an understanding the spaces in which these ideas, associated technologies, and practices are encountered and the interplay of orderings of different institutional composition and spatial reach. Only then can a better grasp be gained of the evolving dynamics between market making, the regulatory powers of the state, and their delimitations.
